16 Jun

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM:	Robert M. Gates Deputy Director for Intelligence	
SUBJECT:	The "Red Team"	25X1
feasibility and	emorandum responds to your request of 7 June about the desirability of a Red Team to closely follow the START come up with judgments on what the Soviets would do and how to various changes in the U.S. negotiating posture.	25 X 1
and feasible. 1	Itshell, a Red Team to address negotiating issues is desirable the key question is whether such a Red Team should come from romment or be comprised of individuals from outside the	25X1
3. The Interpretation, and Soviet reactions and soviet reactions.	telligence Community performed this Red Team function from 1969 Those working arms control from a policy standpoint in this however, have had little interest in issues of negotiability tions. They have not often asked us for our assessment of and Soviet reactions although we have occasionally provided such our own initiative. Normally, however, we have been rebuffed these issues.	25X1
extremely useful issues. By the with Soviet att	is no question that the idea of a Red Team would be an laddition to standard interagency analyses on START and INF same token, to be effective, such analysis would have to deal itudes and objectives in the broadest sense. not just in the of specific U.S. negotiating options.	25 X 1
the Red Team be an appropriate	h a group. Other candidates are available as well. Such a prise a Chairman and no more than five or six members, perhaps	25X1 25X1
6. I beli end up not bein	eve that a Red Team comprised of outsiders, very frankly, would be served to an administration that is looking for cal help. We have talked many times before that many Soviet the outside are ideological at one extreme or another and that	25 X 1

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those few who are not generally do not have much time for intelligence-related work. I worry a great deal that a Red Team comprised of the likes of say, a Richard Pipes, Sy Weiss, Mose Harvey and so on would end up preparing tracts that would not identify opportunities as well as dangers. In short, the best opportunity for a Red Team that will be genuinely helpful and perform a responsible role would be for it to come from the Intelligence Community. It also is a legitimate, even required, function of the Intelligence Community.

25X1

7. I believe this group should report to you and that its product should go at a minimum to Judge Clark, the Chief Negotiators and to the other NSC principals who deal with START and INF. The group could have as part of its membership one or two outsiders who have had some experience in arms control and negotiating with the Soviets.

25X1

8. In sum, I suggest that you wholeheartedly endorse the idea of a Red Team as raised by Ken Adelman to follow closely the START negotiations and come up with judgments on what the Soviets would do and how they would react to various changes in the U.S. negotiating posture. I further believe you should make a strong pitch that this should be undertaken by the Intelligence Community as the place most likely to provide both the continuity of experience in dealing with the Soviets (we have been providing support to negotiators along these lines for 14 years -- never mind how little they have followed our advice) and can begin providing help promptly. It also would assure both objective and realistic analysis that could at the same time be practical and helpful.

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